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Abstract
In this article, the energy market is a modeled as a Stackelberg game involving
three categories of agents: microgrids made of end users sharing the same energy
provider, suppliers and generators. The energy production is decentralized involv-
ing non-renewables, renewables and demand response performed at the microgrid
level. We compute analytically the Nash equilibrium of the game in the generators’
production prices, efforts invested in their capacity, and, in the suppliers’ energy
orders. Furthermore, we prove that the generators’ and the demand response prices
can be obtained as functions of the price paid by the end users per unit of demand.
Finally, coupling the energy and the capacity markets, we design rules for the ca-
pacity market guaranteeing the system wide balance and the market opening to
new investors while avoiding moral hazard and abuse of dominant positions.
1 Introduction
Capacity markets have proven to be one of the most contentious elements of electricity
restructuring [2], [3], [7], [14]. Many argue there is no need for a capacity market [14].
Other argue that, while they may be needed, the current designs are inadequate [4]. Still
other argue that capacity markets are essential for encouraging sufficient investment in
new capacities. The relative reluctance for the introduction of a capacity market is
partly due to the failures observed in the US where investments were insufficient and
market power occured [5], [6], [10], [35]. The Nome law [36], voted by the French gov-
ernment in november 2010, aims at accelerating the liberalization of the energy market
and imposes the creation of a capacity market in 2015 which long term goal should be
to balance the offer and the demand. This decision follows the Sido-Poignant report
[37] which puts forward the alarming growth of electric consumption peaks in France.
The necessity of such a law can be justified by the observation that the market does not
seem to pay enough for the investments in peak capacities i.e., peak productions and
voluntary demand responses. Since the market remunerates exclusively the produced
energy volumes, the investments in peak capacities are insufficient. This can lead, in
case of a lack of capacity, to the electrical network blackout, unbearable for the con-
sumers and generating an exorbitant cost for the suppliers [19], [25]. A capacity market
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is based on the principle that it should provide the guarantee that the electrical system
has enough capacity to satisfy the consumers’ needs during the peaks of consumption,
either by requiring suppliers to provide the evidence that they have enough capacity
or, by elaborating a supplementary mechanism involving the regulator’s intervention
to guarantee the balance between the demand and the supply [26]. This supplementary
mechanism is called feedback mechanism in the capacity market literature. The role of
regulator or market designer can be played indifferently by the network operator or by
the State. In the article, the regulator will be called Principal. Indeed, this is the dedi-
cated term used in game theory to designate the agent who centralizes the information
and implements the mechanism optimizing the system wide operations [23], [24].
Delivering a reliable power supply to consumers has always been a central objec-
tive of market design and various solutions to this challenge have been adopted all over
the world. This diversity reflects the differences in power systems characteristics, in-
cluding the mix of resources1 used to generate electricity and to balance the supply
and the demand [20], [27], [34]. The EU commission analysis confirms that the share
of power generation provided by renewables will need to continue to increase after
2020 in all scenarios considered, exceeding 50% in 2030. Resource availability within
Europe implies that a significant proportion of this renewable generation will have to
be produced from resources that are only intermittently available such as solar, wind,
swell, etc. This rise raises a new type of reliability question regarding the definition of
the right type of resources in which investments should be concentrated [4], [9]. This
is described in the literature as the system quality challenge [9]: how can the Principal
incentivate the generators to invest in sufficient capacities in the right locations and of
the right type i.e., according to the most economically efficient mix [19], and also in
demand response, in storage resources and processes, to satisfy a reliability standard at
least cost [4], [9]? Both short term and long term aspects should be differentiated in the
system quality. In the short term the question is whether the system has effective ac-
cess to all of the cost effective flexibility2 available from the existing resource portfolio
including existing demand response potential [14]. The long term aspect is whether the
market supports investment in a portfolio of new and existing supply and demand side
resources capable of efficiently and cost effectively meeting the projected need for flex-
ible resource capabilities over investment time horizons. The power system will need
resources capable of rapidly changing output or switching demand frequently and con-
tinuously throughout the year depending on the energy availability from intermittent
renewables [33]. Besides, the balancing mechanism whereby the system administrator
buys and sells energy in real time to maintain the system balance has become a criti-
cal element of power market design. Its expanding through physical interconnections
between regions is necessary to decrease the probability of extreme events [33].
Capacity and energy markets are clearly coupled. In this article, this latter is mod-
eled as a Stackelberg game. Such an approach was successfully used in [15], [16] to
capture the hierarchical economic structure of the smart grid. Three categories of ac-
1Over time, existing resources will become uneconomic, often as a result of changes in environmental
regulations or the cost of carbon emissions, and will be closed.
2The essential parameters to define the flexibility are how fast, how far and how frequently a resource
can be started and stopped or ramped up and down both within scheduling intervals and across multiple
scheduling intervals.
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tors are considered: the suppliers who deliver energy to the end users, the microgrids
which are aggregations of end users sharing a common geographic area and the same
provider, the generators who hold capacities and produce energy. The microgrids can
become producers. This point will be detailed later in the article. The market structure
i.e., the number of generators and the number of suppliers, are considered as param-
eters of the game. At the lower level, the suppliers optimize the quantities of energy
that they buy to the generators and to the microgrids in order to maximize their util-
ity. At the upper level, the generators optimize their price per energy unit and their
effort so as to maximize their utility. A second market occurs between the Principal,
which can be indifferently the regulator, the State, etc., and the capacity owners. The
capacity owners have the opportunity to perform an effort, by investing in their source
of energy, to reduce their marginal cost. In turn, this enables them to produce more at
the same cost. The major difficulty is that the production generation process is decen-
tralized, mainly due to the introduction of renewable energy sources, and very difficult
to forecast. To balance the supply and the demand, to avoid moral hazard [11], [12],
[23], to guarantee the market opening to new investors and to avoid abuse of dominant
positions, the Principal aims at designing rules for the game based on side-payments
transferred to the generators and on the delivery of capacity certificates. The capacity
market mechanism is designed under the assumption that the demand reaches a peak
of consumption plus a reservation margin to prevent from extreme events.
We detail the article organization. In Section 2, we describe and solve the Stackel-
berg game occuring between the suppliers and the generators. In Section 3, we design
the mechanism checking the four properties above mentioned. In Section 4, we run
simulations enabling us to calibrate the market parameters and to check the efficiency
of the designed mechanism.
2 The energy market model
We consider a holistic system made of three imbricated levels, as depicted in Figure 1.
In the first level, the K ∈ N∗ generators (Gk)k=1,...,K capacities of production are
determined according to the processes (q¯k)k=1,...,K . For example, we can make the as-
sumption that the producers are classified into categories of resources such as: nuclear,
gas, coal, oil, hydraulic, wind, solar. Each generator produces a specific category of
resource. This aggregation hypothesis reduces the uncertainty on the renewable energy
production. The generators can either open or shut down their production capacities.
The state of the production capacity associated with generator Gk i.e., either open or
closed, is contained in a variable ak ∈ {0; 1} such that ak = 1 if the production
capacity is open and ak = 0 if it is closed. The generators optimize independently
and simultaneously their energy price and their effort, also called investment [1], [30],
so as to maximize their utility. This latter coincides with the revenue resulting from
the selling of their resource production to the suppliers minus the cost and the effort
dedicated to their production. In the model, the effort can be thought in terms of a gen-
erator renewing equipments to more efficient ones, expanding production capacities,
adopting improved technologies, or investing in research and development for process
innovation [30].
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In the second level, the N ∈ N∗ suppliers (si)i=1,...,N buy energy to satisfy their
microgrid energy demand. Throughout the paper, we will assume that microgrid Mi’s
energy demand, Di, is the value reached at peaks of consumption, as publicly declared
by the suppliers, plus a reservation margin, which takes into account the uncertainties
and the biases in the estimation resulting from extreme events. Each supplier si pro-
vides energy to a single microgrid Mi. This assumption can be justified by geographic
considerations: the cost of energy transport being high [22], each supplier covers a
bounded geographic area. There is no overlapping between the geographic areas. We
let qik be the quantity of energy3 bought by supplier si to generatorGk. Supplier si can
obtain energy through three means: they can buy energy to the generators or, to the mi-
crogrids, provided these latter perform demand response or, they can exchange energy
with the other suppliers. The microgrid capacities of production will be determined
according to the processes (q¯ei )i=1,...,N . The capacities bought by the supplier should
be carefully optimized, so as to guarantee that his microgrid will be served during the
peaks of consumption. The suppliers optimize independently and simultaneously the
bought quantities of energy so as to maximize their utility. This latter coincides with
the difference between, on the one hand, the sum of their net utility representing their
preferences regarding the energy sources, which are symmetrically related substitutes,
and of the price paid by the microgrid to meet its demand, and, on the other hand, the
costs of the energy purchases to the portfolio of generators.
In the third level, microgrids contain eco-neighborhoods made of houses, of various
categories of firms and of non-profit State administered organizations, etc. [17]. The
microgrids can become generators by deploying solar pannels or wind turbines either
at individual scales or in commonly shared areas [29]. They can also perform stor-
age thanks to electric vehicle batteries, chemical or thermal processes [17]. Demand
responses can be performed at the consumer level [22]. It enables the shifting of the
consumer demand from one period where a peak of consumption is expected, to an-
other period where the demand remains low [32]. It can be implemented in two ways:
either through contracts defined between the suppliers and the end users or through
pricing mechanisms providing economic incentives for the end users to shift their con-
sumption. Some microgrids might produce more than their current demand generating
energy surpluses. Microgrids, which produce not enough to meet their own demand,
might bargain with microgrids generating energy surpluses [29]. An energy market
might therefore occur between the microgrids. However, in our model, the exchanges
of energy between the microgrids would be performed by the suppliers. As already
mentioned, the cost of energy transport being high, it is unrealistic to assume that ex-
changes occurred between geographically distant suppliers. Furthermore, we assumed
that each supplier delivers energy to a well delimitated geographic area and that there
is no overlapping. As a result, the geographic provision areas being wide enough, we
choose to ignore the energy transfers between the suppliers because they would be
negligeable.
Other agents such as a regulator or the State can intervene. They will be aggre-
gated in a single agent called Principal. His objective is to induce supply to invest in
3The quantities of energy bought by the supplier to each generator coincides with a part of his production
capacity. In fact, the suppliers buy capacity access to the generators. In return, the generators undertake to
release these capacities when peaks of consumption occur.
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sufficient generation in the right locations and of the right type i.e., according to the
most economically efficient mix [19], and also in demand side and in storage resources
[9], to satisfy a reliability standard at least cost [4], [9]. Of course, the Principal may
promote certain categories of energy compared to others according to some ideological
positions like green (i.e., renewables) or clean (i.e., without carbon emission) versus
non-green, political reasons, etc. [22].
We now introduce the following definitions with the resource use:
Definition 1. • The number of resources among the K which are active is con-
tained in K¯ ∈ N∗ such that 0 ≤ K¯ ≤ K.
• For resources K¯ + 1 ≤ k ≤ K that are inactive, we use the conventions: qik =
0,∀i = 1, ..., N and q¯k = 0.
• Resource k = 1, ..., K¯ is said to be saturated if, and only if,
∑
i=1,...,N
qik = q¯k.
• The number of resources among the K¯ which are saturated is contained inKs ∈
N∗ such that 0 ≤ Ks ≤ K¯.
According to the literature, guaranteeing the electrical system reliability can be
performed using two approaches: either requiring the suppliers to provide the evidence
that they have enough capacity or elaborating a supplementary mechanism involving
the Principal’s intervention to guarantee the network balance [26]. This latter is known
as feedback mechanism in the capacity market literature [7], [20], [26]. The Principal’s
intervention is captured through side-payments addressed to the generators. It can
take the form of punishments such as carbon taxes when the Principal’s objective is to
minimize the system wide ecological footprint, or, on the contrary, of financial supports
in case where the Principal wants to invest in a specific category of energy4.
2.1 Description of the generators’ optimization program
Generator Gk determines his price p˜k per unit of energy bought by the suppliers and
his effort uk , so as to maximize his utility. The generators’ prices are supposed ordered
so that:
p˜k−1 ≤ p˜k ≤ p˜k+1, ∀k = 2, ..., K¯ − 1 (1)
and at the boundaries: 0 ≤ p˜1 ≤ p˜2 and p˜K¯−1 ≤ p˜K¯ < +∞. This order is arbi-
trarily chosen. Following the merit order principle [22], the suppliers will start to buy
energy to the cheapest generator until his resource becomes saturated then, they will
buy energy to the second cheapest, and so on until satisfaction of the microgrid whole
demand.
Generator Gk’s utility is:
p˜ik = (p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk + Tk (2)
4Examples of financial supports provided by the State can be found in the deployment of renewables, in
power plant dismantling or, in the investment in research and development efforts promoting fourth genera-
tion reactors.
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Figure 1: A holistic system.
The marginal cost ck, supported by generator Gk, decreases exponentially in the effort
made by the generator. The dependency is captured by the following equation:
ck = ck0 exp
(
− ρψ(uk)
)
(3)
and the set of initial conditions {ck0}k=1,...,K¯ . The parameter ρ > 0 denotes the poten-
tial technological progress characteristic to the industry, also referred as technological
opportunity, which can be attained if generators make what the literature calls in gen-
eral terms an effort [30]. In the model it is denoted uk ≥ 0. The form of Equation (3)
captures economies of scales which are highly prevalent in industries based on network
infrastructures or involving large investments in research and development. Here, they
are all the more important as the capacities are aggregated by resource category. Be-
sides, the form of the equation implies that each generator’s effort impacts only his own
cost and not his competitors’ i.e., there is no spillovers or no leakage of information
between the generators which would have led to cross-effects in their cost reduction.
The function ψ(.) is a measure of the efficiency of the effort in reducing costs. We
impose natural properties to the efficiency function: it must be increasing with the ef-
fort ψ′(.) > 0 but decreasing returns to scale ψ′′(.) < 0, zero if no effort is made
ψ(0) = 0. Tk ≤ 0 contains the side-payments between the Principal and generator Gk.
It is negative in case of punishments resulting from the network imbalance.
For any generator Gk, k = 1, ...,K, the optimization program takes the form:
max
p˜k,uk
p˜ik
s. t. p˜k−1 ≤ p˜k ≤ p˜k+1
uk ≥ 0
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2.2 Description of the suppliers’ optimization program
Supplier si determines the quantity of resource qik and ei that he buys to generator Gk
and to microgrid Mi respectively, so as to maximize his utility. Di will represent the
end users’ demand during the peaks of consumption plus a reservation margin. The
end users in the microgrid Mi pay supplier si, pi per unit of Di. Depending on the
form of the implemented contract, supplier si has the opportunity to complement the
quantities of energy that he bought to the generators by buying the missing quantities
to the end users. These latter can release energy through demand responses, through
their own production or through storage devices. The sum of the energy released by the
microgrid Mi through demand responses, various means of productions and storage, is
stored in q¯ei . Microgrid Mi is retributed by supplier si according to the unit price p
e
i .
Various approaches to model the product preferences exist in the micro-economic
literature [21], [31]. The K resources categories are symmetrically related substitute.
In our model, the representative supplier si has preferences following Shubik and Lev-
itan’s quadratic utility function [8], [30]5. His net utility takes the form:
Ui =
∑
k=1,...,K¯
qik + ei − 1
2
( ∑
k=1,...,K¯
qik + ei
)2
− K
2(1 + γ)
[ ∑
k=1,...,K¯
q2ik
+ e2i −
1
K
( ∑
k=1,...,K¯
qik + ei
)2]
where the parameter γ ≥ 0 measures the substitutability of the resources. Resources
are perfect substitute when γ → +∞. On the contrary, they are completely differen-
tiate when γ = 0. This form of utility is used in industrial organization economics to
take into account product differentiation in marketing [18] or online advertising [13].
This choice of representation is motivated by the fact that it will enable us to evalu-
ate the impact of the energy mix on the allocation of the suppliers’ energy orders and
to test the impact of the suppliers’ point of view regarding the substitutability of the
resources. Indeed, for ideological or marketing reasons, some suppliers might want
to promote their virtuous image by certifying the origin of their energy, for instance
only green energy with zero carbon emission, or nuclear free, etc. Such criteria are
more and more mentioned by marketing advertisers [22]. As a result, it seems quite
necessary to introduce in the suppliers’ preferences a parameter modeling the resource
substitutability.
For a given set of prices
(
p˜k
)
k
, the representative supplier determines for each
generator and for the microgrid, the energy orders that maximize his utility:
pii = Ui + piDi −
( ∑
k=1,...,K
p˜kqik + p
e
i ei
)
The quantities of energy bought by supplier si to the generators, (qik)k, and to the
microgrid Mi, ei, will be expressed as functions in the prices per unit of production for
5The formulation, proposed by Höffler [8], allows for a consistent welfare analysis of the number of
available resource categories in the energy market.
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the various sources of energy and in the prices per unit of demand response. Further-
more, in Corollary 5, we will prove that the generators’ prices are linear functions in
the demand reponse prices and in Proposition 7, it will be possible to express demand
response prices as functions in the suppliers’ prices per demand unit (pi)i. The prices
per demand unit (pi)i are inputs of the model. They are designed by the suppliers
to maximize their utility but, at the same time, controlled by the Principal, to prevent
suppliers’ abuse of dominant position and to guarantee that the energy available at the
microgrid level will not be wasted.
For any supplier si, i = 1, ..., N , the optimization program takes the form:
max
(qik)k,ei
pii (4)
s. t.
∑
j=1,...,N
qjk ≤ q¯k,∀k = 1, ...,K
0 ≤ ei ≤ q¯ei∑
k=1,...,K
qik + ei = Di
The last constraint traduces the balance between the total quantity of energy which
is provided to supplier si, on the left, and the quantity of energy which is provided by
supplier si to meet microgrid Mi’s demand, on the right.
2.3 Description of the energy market game
The electrical network energy loss6 is measured by the sum, over each supplier, of the
differences between the total quantity of energy that he bought to the generators and
his associated microgrid consumption, defined as the difference between its demand
and the quantity that it sells back to the supplier.
Definition 2. The electrical network energy loss is measured by the following function:
f(K¯,Ks) =
∑
i=1,...,N
[ ∑
k=1,...,K¯
qik − (Di − ei)
]2
The static game can be broken in two steps: the generators acting first can be seen
as the leaders whereas the suppliers acting second, appear to be the followers. Such
games are usually called Stackelberg games. They are solved using backward induction
[15], [16], [23].
The sequences (q¯k)k and (q¯ei )i are determined as realizations of exogenous pro-
cesses that can be random [17] or take the form of indivual sequences [16]. They rep-
resent the productions of the capacities hold by the generators and by the microgrids.
They are publicly announced to the Principal.
We now detail the steps of the game:
6In Subsections 2.1 and 2.2, the optimal quantities of energy are determined during a peak of consump-
tion. Under the non restrictive assumption that this peak lasts one hour, one energy unit corresponds to one
power unit. Therefore, the electrical network loss can be measured in power units, as usual.
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(i) a) The generators (Gk)k determine the number of resources among the K to
activate so as to minimize the electrical network energy loss i.e., minK¯ f(K¯,Ks)
(i) b) Generator Gk chooses p˜k and uk independently and simultaneously so as
to maximize his utility.
(ii) a) The suppliers (si)i determine the number of resources among the K¯ to sat-
urate so as to minimize the electrical network energy loss i.e., minKs f(K¯,Ks)
(ii) b) Supplier si chooses (qik)k and ei independently and simultaneously so as
to maximize his utility.
The side-payments do not intervene in the energy market game.
2.4 Resolution of the energy market game
We let σ˜∗k =
(
p˜∗k, u
∗
k
)
and σ∗i =
(
(q∗ik)k, e
∗
i
)
be the pure strategies of generators Gk
and suppliers si respectively. It is useful to introduce the following notations. The set
of all possible strategies available to supplier si (resp. generator Gk) will be denoted
Σi (resp. Σ˜k).
We introduce the variable ε > 0 such that ε → 0. It will be used throughout the
article.
Proposition 3. The static game admits a unique Nash equilibrium in (σ˜∗k)k, (σ∗i )i.
Proof of Proposition 3. The Lagrangian function resulting from supplier si’s con-
strained optimization problem as described by the system of Equations (4) and evalu-
ated at the optimum
(
(qik)k, ei
)
i
, takes the form:
Li = pii +
∑
k=1,...,Ks
µk
( ∑
j=1,...,N
qjk − q¯k
)
+ λi
[ ∑
k=1,...,K¯
qik + ei −Di
]
where the multipliers µk, λi are real numbers. The coefficient µk is identical for all
the suppliers because the associated inequality constraint is the same for all of them.
According to the Karush-Kühn-Tucker conditions, we have the following relations for
the inequality constraints:
µk
( ∑
j=1,...,N
qjk − q¯k
)
= 0
and µk ≥ 0,∀k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯. But for k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯, resource k is never satu-
rated i.e.,
∑
j=1,...,N
qjk − q¯k < 0. This implies in turn that µk = 0,∀k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯.
Therefore, it is useless to introduce the inequality constraints in the Lagrangian func-
tion, at the optimum.
To optimize supplier si decisions in the quantity of energy to buy to the generators
and to microgrid Mi, we start by differentiating the Lagrangian function Li with re-
spect to qik and to ei. The differentiation of the Lagangian function Li with respect to
qik takes two forms depending on the position of k with respect to Ks:
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• If k ∈ {1, ...,Ks} then ∂Li∂qik = ∂pii∂qik + µk + λi.
• If k ∈ {Ks + 1, ..., K¯} then ∂Li∂qik = ∂pii∂qik + λi.
While the differentiation of Li with respect to ei gives: ∂Li∂ei =
∂pii
∂ei
+ λi.
At the optimum in
(
(qik)k, ei
)
i
, we have the relation: ∂Li∂qik =
∂Li
∂ei
. Depending on
the position of k with respect to Ks, two cases should be distinguished:
• If k ∈ {Ks + 1, ..., K¯} then we obtain:
qik = ei +
1 + γ
K
(pei − p˜k), ∀k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯ (5)
• If k ∈ {1, ...,Ks} then we obtain:
qik = ei +
1 + γ
K
(pei − p˜k) +
1 + γ
K
µk, ∀k = 1, ...,Ks (6)
By summation of Equation (6) over i = 1, ..., N , we get:
µk =
K
N(1 + γ)
[
q¯k −
∑
i=1,...,N
ei
]
− 1
N
∑
i=1,...,N
(pei − p˜k) (7)
By substitution of Equation (5) in the last constraint of the system of Equations (4),
we infer the relation:∑
k=1,...,Ks
qik + (K¯ −Ks + 1)ei = Di − 1 + γ
K
[
(K¯ −Ks)pei
−
∑
k=Ks+1,...,K¯
p˜k
]
(8)
Then, by substitution of Equation (6) in Equation (8), we obtain the optimal quantity
for supplier si to buy to microgrid Mi as a function of the difference between the price
fixed by microgrid Mi and the generators’ prices and of the Lagrange multipliers for
all the saturated generators:
ei =
1
K¯ + 1
Di − 1 + γ
K(K¯ + 1)
∑
k=1,...,K¯
(pei − p˜k)−
1 + γ
K(K¯ + 1)
∑
k=1,...,Ks
µk (9)
For the sake of simplicity, we let: δik = pei − p˜k be the difference between the price
fixed by microgridMi and generatorGk’s price. Substituting µk, as described in Equa-
tion (7), in ei expression as obtained in Equation (9), we infer the following relation
between the quantities of energy bought by the suppliers to the microgrids and the price
differences:
(1 − K
s
K¯ + 1
)ei − K
s
K¯ + 1
∑
j 6=i
ej =
1
K¯ + 1
Di − 1 + γ
K(K¯ + 1)
∑
k=1,...,K¯
δik
− 1
K¯ + 1
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k +
1 + γ
NK(K¯ + 1)
∑
j=1,...,N
∑
k=1,...,Ks
δjk (10)
We make the following assumptions:
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• Without loss of generalities, we assume that it is the microgrid M1 which gener-
ates the highest quantity of energy i.e., e1 = maxj=1,...,N{ej}.
• The demand responses performed by the other microgrids can be expressed
as linear functions of the demand response performed by microgrid M1. This
means that there exists a real sequence {β(j)}j=2,...,N such that 0 ≤ β(j) ≤ 1
and ej = β(j)e1,∀j = 2, ..., N.
According to the above assumptions, Equation (10) can then be re-written. We
obtain:
e1 =
( K¯ + 1
(K¯ + 1)−
[
1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)
]
Ks
)[ 1
K¯ + 1
(D1 −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k)
− ν(
∑
k=1,...,K¯
δ1k − 1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
∑
k=1,...,Ks
δjk)
]
(11)
where we set: ν ≡ ν(K, γ) = 1+γK(K+1) .
To optimize generator Gk’s optimal decision in price and effort, two cases should
be distinguished depending on the position of k with respect to Ks.
• If k ∈ {Ks+1, ..., K¯} then resource k is not saturated i.e.,
∑
j=1,...,N
qjk < q¯k. For
j = 1, ..., N , any qjk can be expressed as a linear function in e1. We then start
by substituting e1 expression, as defined in Equation (11), in the (qjk)j , derived
from Equation (5). (qjk)j are components of generator Gk’s utility, which is
defined in Equation (2). By differentiation with respect to p˜k, we obtain:
p˜k =
∑
j=1,...,N
p˜a(j, k) +
1 + γ
K
∑
j=1,...,N
pej
2
[
Nν(K¯+1)
(K¯+1)−[1+
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
−N 1+γK
] − 1
2
ck (12)
where we set:
p˜a(j, k) =
K¯ + 1
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
m=2,...,N
β(m)]Ks
[ 1
K¯ + 1
(Dj −
∑
l=1,...,Ks
q¯l)
− ν(
∑
l=1,...,K¯,l 6=k
δjl + p
e
j −
1
N
∑
m=1,...,N
∑
l=1,...,Ks
δml)
]
Additionally, we introduce the auxiliary variable:
ca =
K
(
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
)
N(1 + γ)
(
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
)
−NKν(K¯ + 1)
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Differentiating generator Gk’s utility, as defined in Equation (2), with respect to
ck and by substitution of p˜k, we obtain:
ck =
5
3
ca
∑
j=1,...,N
(
p˜a(j, k) +
1 + γ
K¯
pej
)
(13)
But, according to Equation (3), we have: ckck0 = exp(−ρψ(uk)). Function ψ(.)
being continuous and strictly increasing by assumption, it is invertible. As a
result, it is possible to infer generator Gk’s optimal effort as a function of his
optimal cost as described just above: uk = ψ−1(− 1ρ log ckck0 ).
• If k ∈ {1, ...,Ks} then resource k is saturated i.e.,
∑
j=1,...,N
qjk = q¯k. Using
the previous assumption that ej = β(j)e1,∀j = 2, ..., N , we substitute e1, as
obtained in Equation (11), in (qjk)j , as defined in Equation (6). We infer that
(qjk)j does not depend on p˜k since e1 does not depend anymore on p˜k. This
means that generator Gk’s utility, as defined in Equation (2), is linear increasing
in p˜k. A solution is to choose: p˜k = p˜Ks+1 −
(
(Ks + 1)− k
)
ε with ε > 0 and
ε→ 0.
Differentiating p˜ik with respect to uk we obtain:
∂p˜ik
∂uk
= ρck0q¯kψ
′(uk) exp
(
− ρψ(uk)
)
− 1
Generator Gk’s optimal effort belongs to the following set:
uk =
{
u ≥ 0|ψ′(u) exp
(
− ρψ(u)
)
=
1
ρck0q¯k
}
The solution is unique since the function ψ′(u) exp
(
− ρψ(u)
)
is strictly de-
creasing in u. Indeed by differentiation with respect to u, we obtain:
ψ′′(u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
exp
(
− ρψ(u)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ψ′(u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
− ρψ′(u)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
exp
(
− ρψ(u)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
Corollary 4. If supplier s1 buys microgrid M1’s total production, the microgrid’s ca-
pacity can be expressed as a linear function in the distances between, on the one hand,
its demand and the sum of the saturated generators’ capacities and, on the other hand,
between the
∑
k=1,...,K¯
δ1k and the mean of the
( ∑
k=1,...,Ks
δjk
)
j=1,...,N
:
q¯e1 =
1
K¯ + 1− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
{
(D1 −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k)
− ν(K¯ + 1)
( ∑
k=1,...,K¯
δ1k − 1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
∑
k=1,...,Ks
δjk
)}
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Proof of Corollary 4. If supplier s1 buys the total quantity of energy proposed
by microgrid M1 then e1 = q¯e1. By substitution of this equality in Equation (11), we
derive that microgrid M1’s capacity depends linearly on the differences between its
demand and the saturated generators’ capacities (D1 −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k). Furthermore,
microgrid M1’s capacity depends linearly on the coefficiented differences between its
demand response price and the other producers’ prices ; this factorization coefficient
can be expressed as:
∑
k=1,...,K¯
δ1k − 1
N
∑
j=1,...,N
∑
k=1,...,Ks
δjk = K¯
(
(1 − K
s
K¯
)pe1 −
Ks
K¯
∑
j=2,...,N
pej−
1
K¯
∑
k=Ks+1,...,K¯
p˜k
)
.Among the active generators, the saturated gen-
erators’ impact is already evaluated in the first part of the equation.
Corollary 5. For any generator Gk with k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯, his price per unit of
energy can be expressed as a linear function in the sum of the suppliers’ prices per unit
of demand response:
p˜k = η
∑
j=1,...,N
pej + ζk
where:
η =
4ca
ηd
(1 + γ
K
− ν(K¯ + 1)
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
)
ζk =
2caνN(K¯ + 1)
ηd + 2caνN(K¯ + 1)(K¯ −Ks + 1)
[
− K¯(K¯ + 1) + (Ks + 2)(Ks + 3)
− 2
νN(K¯ + 1)
(
∑
j=1,...,N
Dj −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k
K¯ + 1− [1 +
∑
l=2,...,N
β(l)]Ks
) +
N(1 + γ)
K
+ 2ε
]
+ (k −Ks − 1)ε
and ηd = 3(K¯ + 1)− 3[1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks + 2caνN(K¯ + 1)(K¯ −Ks + 1).
Proof of Corollary 5. Going back to p˜Ks+1 expression at equilibrium given in
Equation (12) and substituting the value of ck as derived in Equation (13), we obtain
a simplified expression for the generator GKs+1’s price per demand unit: p˜Ks+1 =
− 43ca
∑
j=1,...,N
(
p˜a(j, k) +
1 + γ
K
pej
)
. By substitution of the analytical expression of
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p˜a(j, k) in the previous equation, we obtain the following relation:
p˜Ks+1 +
4
3
ca
νN(K¯ + 1)
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
∑
l=Ks+2,...,K¯
p˜l
= −4
3
ca
∑
l=1,...,N
[
1
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
(Dl −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k)
+ (
1 + γ
K
− ν(K¯ + 1)
(K¯ + 1)− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
)pel ] (14)
According to this equation, the generators’ price per demand unit are linearly depen-
dent. We make the assumption that:
p˜k = p˜Ks+1 +
(
k − (Ks + 1)
)
ε, ∀k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯ (15)
Substituting Equation (15) in Equation (14), we infer that it is possible to express
p˜Ks+1 as a function of (pel )l=1,...,N and of the game parameters exclusively. We obtain:
p˜Ks+1 =
2
3c
aνN(K¯ + 1)
K¯ + 1−
[
1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)
]
Ks +
4
3
(K¯ −Ks + 1)caνN(K¯ + 1)
{
(Ks + 2)(Ks + 3) + 2ε− K¯(K¯ + 1)
− 2
ν(K¯ + 1)
[ 1
K¯ + 1− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
(
∑
l=1,...,N
Dl −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k)
+
1
N
(
1 + γ
K
− ν(K¯ + 1)
K¯ + 1− [1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
)
∑
l=1,...,N
pel
]}
By substitution in Equation (15) and by identification, we infer the analytical expres-
sions of η, ηd and ζk.
We recall that for k = 1, ...,Ks, the expression of the generators (Gk)k=1,...,Ks
prices at equilibrium was obtained in Proposition 3 proof:
p˜k = p˜Ks+1 −
(
(Ks + 1)− k
)
ε
2.5 Description of the Nash equilibrium computation algorithm
Proposition 6. There exist only K admissible combinations of (ak)k satisfying the
price constraints defined in Equation (1).
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Proof of Proposition 6. According to the ordering assumption made on the p˜k in
Equation (1), we necessarily have a1 = 1 since the microgrids’ total demand cannot
be zero. Furthermore, if al = 0, necessarily al+1 = 0. This implication holds for any
l = 2, ...,K − 1. As a result, the set of admissible combinations of active generators
contains all the combinations where the l = 1, ...,K − 1 first generators are active
while the others are closed and the combination where all the generators are active.
This leads to a total of K admissible combinations for (ak)k.
As already mentioned in Subsection 2.3, the generators’ and the microgrids’ ca-
pacities (q¯k)k and (q¯ei )i are supposed to be exogenous to the model. The microgrids’
demands (Di)i are fixed at their peak value plus a reservation margin. In addition to
the demand unit prices (pi)i which are designed by the suppliers but controlled by the
Principal to avoid abuse of dominant positions and energy wastings, we recall below
the list of the game parameters that will need to be calibrated:
• N,K the market structure
• ck0 generator Gk’s initial marginal cost
• γ ≥ 0 the energy substitutability parameter
• ρ > 0 the technological opportunity
• ε > 0 such that ε→ 0
• {β(j)}j=2,...,N such that β(j) ∈ [0; 1] and ej = β(j)e1,∀j = 2, ..., N
We describe below the algorithm which enables the computation of the game Nash
equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Nash Equilibrium Computation
1: For each of the K admissible combinations of (ak)k determine
Ks ∈ [[0;
∑
k=1,...,K
ak]] minimizing f(
∑
k=1,...,K
ak,Ks).
2: Evaluate numerically the Nash equilibrium (σk)k, (σi)i
3: Keep in memory the optimum K∗s
(
(ak)k
)
and the value of the objective
function f
( ∑
k=1,...,K
ak,K
∗
s ((ak)k)
)
4: The generators (Gk)k determine the combination (ak)∗k minimizing the set of
the admissible values for the objective function f
( ∑
k=1,...,K
ak,K
∗
s ((ak)k)
)
over
the set of admissible combinations (ak)k
The number of active generators are determined as an output of the algorithm i.e.,
K¯ =
∑
k=1,...,K
(ak)
∗.
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2.6 Analytical computation of the demand response price
The price proposed by the supplier s1 per unit of demand response can be optimized
by the Principal to guarantee that the microgrid’s welfare remains non-negative and to
avoid the supplier’s abuse of dominant position. We make the assumption that there
exists a positive real sequence {θ(j)}j=2,...,N such that pej = θ(j)pe1,∀j = 2, ..., N.
Furthermore, since microgrid M1 generates the higher demand response, it is realis-
tic to assume that this high level, which requires a real effort in terms of flexibility
and storage capacity at the microgrid’s level, is consecutive to a high demand at the
supplier’s level. Therefore, we set: e1 = q¯e1.
We go back to the expression of e1, as derived in Corollary 4, where we expressed
q¯e1 as a function of (p
e
j)j=1,...,N and of (p˜k)k=Ks+1,...,K¯ . Substituting the analytical
expression of p˜k for k = Ks + 1, ..., K¯, as obtained in Corollary 5, we derive the
following relation:
q¯e1 =
1
K¯ + 1− [1−
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
(
D1 −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k
+ ν(K¯ + 1)
∑
k=Ks+1,...,K¯
ζk
)
+
ν(K¯ + 1)
K¯ + 1− [1−
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
[(
(K¯ −Ks)η + K
s
N
)(
1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
θ(j)
)
− K¯
]
pe1
Therefore, q¯e1 is a linear function in p
e
1. We set: q¯
e
1 = w1 + v1p
e
1 where, by identi-
fication:
w1 =
1
K¯ + 1− [1−
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
(
D1 −
∑
k=1,...,Ks
q¯k +
+ ν(K¯ + 1)
∑
k=Ks+1,...,K¯
ζk
)
+
ν(K¯ + 1)
K¯ + 1− [1−
∑
j=2,...,N
β(j)]Ks
v1 =
(
(K¯ −Ks)η + K
s
N
)(
1 +
∑
j=2,...,N
θ(j)
)
− K¯
Proposition 7. • If v1 ≥ 0 then microgrid M1’s social welfare is non-negative if,
and only if, pe1 ≥ −w1+
√
w21+4v1p1D1
2v1
.
• If −w214p1D1 ≤ v1 < 0 and w1 ≥ 0 then microgrid M1’s social welfare is non-
negative if, and only if, −w1+
√
w21+4v1p1D1
2v1
≤ pe1 ≤ −w1−
√
w21+4v1p1D1
2v1
.
• Otherwise, microgrid M1’s social welfare always remains negative.
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Proof of Proposition 7. Microgrid M1’s social welfare, sw1, is defined as the dif-
ference between the revenue received from supplier s1 and the revenue paid to supplier
s1 i.e., sw1 = pe1e1 − p1D1. The microgrid’s net utility resulting from the benefit per-
ceived through the consumption of D1 unit of demand is set equal to zero7. Using the
fact that q¯e1 can be rewritten as: q¯
e
1 = w1 + v1p
e
1, microgrid M1’s social welfare can be
rewritten to give:
sw1 = p
e
1e1 − p1D1
= (pe1)
2v1 + p
e
1w1 − p1D1
Microgrid M1’s social welfare can be interpreted as a second order polynomial equa-
tion in pe1. Depending on the sign of v1, two cases should be distinguished.
If v1 ≥ 0 then sw1 admits 2 roots in pe1 of opposite sign since the constant term
of the polynomial equation is negative. The demand response price being positive, we
infer that in case where v1 ≥ 0, sw1 ≥ 0 if, and only if, pe1 is greater than the highest
value root.
If v1 < 0 then provided the polynomial equation discriminant w21 + 4v1p1D1 ≥ 0
i.e., v1 ≥ − w
2
1
4p1D1
, microgrid M1’s social welfare is non-negative if, and only if, pe1
belongs to the interval which bounds are defined by the two roots of the polynomial
equation. These two roots share the same sign since the constant term of the polyno-
mial equation is negative. There are both non-negative if, and only if, the maximum
of the polynomial equation is reached in a positive demand response price. But, the
polynomial equation reaches its maximum in pe1 =
−w1
2v1
. Therefore, it is positive if,
and only if, w1 ≥ 0.
Since it is the price fixed by supplier s1 for each unit of demand response, he will
choose the smallest value avoiding him reaching an abusive dominant position. We
conclude that:
• If v1 ≥ 0 then pe1 = −w1+
√
w21+4v1p1D1
2v1
+ ε.
• If −w214p1D1 ≤ v1 < 0 and w1 ≥ 0 then pe1 =
−w1+
√
w21+4v1p1D1
2v1
+ ε.
• The case v1 < −w
2
1
4p1D1
or w1 < 0 corresponds either to an abuse of dominant po-
sition of the supplier over the microgrid, since this latter’s social welfare always
remains negative in this case, or to the case where the generators’ capacities of
production are so large that the suppliers do not need to buy very much energy
to the microgrids. Therefore, the Principal will control that the game parameters
and the demand prices (pi)i are calibrated so as to avoid falling in this latter case.
These results are consistent with the demand response operators’ intense requirements
to remunerate voluntary demand shiftings by indexing its price on the demand price8.
7Generalizations to any other constant value are trival.
8At the moment, residential consumers are not remunerated for voluntary demand shiftings. The expe-
rienced benefit results exclusively from the potential decrease of the electricity bill due to the drop of the
demand. However, the "report" effect is possible which might prevent monetary savings.
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In the model described in this article, the agents’ strategy at equilibrium depends
on their private information about the capacities (q¯k)k and (q¯ei )i. Furthermore, the
generators’ utilities depend on the side-payments, (Tk)k, delivered by the Principal to
the generators, as captured in Equation (2). These side-payments represent a first lever
of action, with which the Principal can play while designing the capacity market rules.
The other lever of action appears through the delivery of capacity certificates. Both
levers will be used as powerful tools for the design of the capacity market rules.
3 Mechanism design for the capacity market
The game studied in this article is with asymmetric information since the true capac-
ities (q¯0k)k and (q¯
e0
i )i are known only by their producer. These constitute the private
information, also known as the types [23], [24], of the generators and of the microgrids.
At the network level, the generators and the microgrids monitor their productions using
sensors deployed on their park of production or in the houses of the eco-neighborhoods,
for solar pannels and storage devices [17]. Each agent (generators and microgrids) re-
ports his estimated capacity production to the Principal: qˆk for generator Gk and qˆei
for microgrid Mi. The reported capacities are then publicly announced on the capacity
market. The major problem is that the reports can be biased i.e., there is no reason
for the agents to report their true type a priori! In the game theory literature, the ten-
dancy of the agents to distort the information by reporting the risk and the monetary
consequences on the other agents is known as moral hazard [23]. Here, moral hazard
might appear if the generators perform capacity retention or, on the contrary, declare
more capacity than they have [5], [6], [11], [12]. The first situation goal is to create
scarcity and then, to make the capacity price increase artificially. In the second situa-
tion, the generators invest less in the capacities than what they declared. In both cases,
the suppliers and the whole market operations are altered.
The mechanism design problem is to implement an optimal system wide solution
to a decentralized optimization problem with self-interested agents with private infor-
mation [24]. In other words, the mechanism design problem is to implement rules of
the game such as defining possible strategies and the method used to select an outcome
based on agents’ strategies, to implement the solution to the social choice function
despite agents’ self-interest. Here, the agents have quasi-linear utility functions [24]
with types (q¯0k)k and (q¯
e0
i )i containing their private information about the capacities.
Quasi-linear utilities make it straightforward to transfer utility across agents, via side-
payments which can take the form of punishments.
We now describe the social choice function. The Principal’s role is to master the
whole system behavior but he does not take part to the definition of the energy orders
and prices ; neither between the microgrids and the suppliers, nor between the suppliers
and the generators. However, he is concerned with the system wide balance. As a
result, he needs to evaluate a posteriori:
φ =
∑
k=1,...,K¯
q¯0k −
∑
i=1,...,N
(
Di − q¯e0i
)
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φ ≡ φ
(
(q¯0k)k, (q¯
e0
i )i
)
measures the difference between the (true) total capacity pro-
duction and the total consumption of the microgrids. The case φ > 0 will be avoided
by the constraints imposed in the certification process that will be explained later. If
φ = 0, the system is perfectly balanced since capacity equals demand. If φ < 0,
capacity is missing. The Principal will need to invest in order to construct the miss-
ing capacity. As already mentioned in the Introduction, this mechanism is known as
feedback mechanism in the capacity market literature [26].
Definition 8. A mechanismm =
(∏
i
Σi
∏
k
Σ˜k, g(.)
)
defines the set of strategies avail-
able to each agent, and an outcome rule g :
∏
i
Σi
∏
k
Σ˜k → O such that g
(
(σi)i, (σ˜k)k
)
is the outcome implemented by the mechanism.
Given mechanism m with outcome function g(.) we say that a mechanism imple-
ments social choice function φ
(
(q¯e0i )i, (q¯
0
k)k
)
if the outcome computed with equi-
librium agent strategies is a solution to the social choice function for all possible
agent information. More explicitely, mechanism m implements social choice function
φ
(
(q¯e0i )i, (q¯
0
k)k
)
if g
(
(σ∗i (q¯
e0
i ))i, (σ˜
∗
k(q¯
0
k))k
)
= φ
(
(q¯e0i )i, (q¯
0
k)k
)
for all (q¯e0i )i, (q¯
0
k)k
∈ RK+N+ where (σ∗i )i, (σ˜∗k)k is the equilibrium solution of the game induced by m.
Its analytical expression is detailed in Propositions 3 and 7 proofs. The outcome rules,
defined by function g(.), contain the side-payments transferred by the Principal to the
generators and the quantities of certified capacities for the generators and for the mi-
crogrids.
The mechanism m, which enables the definition of rules over the capacity market,
should satisfy the three properties below:
• System wide balance (SWB) i.e., φ = 0.
• Individual rationality (IR) i.e., the generators can always achieve as much utility
from entering the capacity market as without participation. The refusal to par-
ticipate to the market leads to a zero utility for the generators9. The IR property
guarantees the market opening to new potential investors.
• Incentive compatibility (IC) i.e., the generators report truthful information about
their production in equilibrium. The IC property avoids moral hazard to occur.
In the following, we will compute the analytical expression of the Principal’s effort
and detail the hierarchical optimization problem, guaranteeing the satisfaction of the
SWB property.
To force the generators and the microgrids to report their true type, the Principal
will certify the capacities maximizing their coefficiented social welfare:∑
k=1,...,K¯
α˜kp˜ik +
∑
i=1,...,N
αipii
9In Section 2, we chose to neglect the energy exchanges between the suppliers. On the contrary, exports
and imports are possible between individual generators producing the same category of energy. In our
model, the generators being aggregated by resource categories, exchanges occur among individual generators
belonging to the same category but not between categories.
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Introducing coefficients (α˜k)k, (αi)i is equivalent with defining a priority profile for
the generators and for the microgrids. Its definition depends on the country’s potential
regarding their geological richness (natural richness in oil, coal or gas, etc.) as well
as on geographic (maritime or river conditions favoring the establishment of off-shore
wind farms or dams, etc.) and climatic aspects (strong sunlight and wind, etc.), and
finally, on political considerations. As a result, it can be thought as the country energy
mix. We make the assumption that the coefficients (α˜k)k are ordered so that α˜k ≥
α˜k+1 i.e., coefficient α˜k is associated with the generator having the k-th highest priority
level. The microgrids will only be called in case where the total capacity produced by
the generators is not sufficient to meet the microgrids’ demand. This implies that α˜K¯ ≥
α1. The priority profile for the microgrids follows the index order. In other words,
microgrid Mi has priority over microgrid Mj provided i < j.. Besides, it is realistic,
regarding the assumptions made in Subsection 2.4, to assume that it is microgrid M1
which produces the highest demand response. Finally, the priority coefficients are
defined so that α˜k, αi ≥ 0,∀k = 1, ..., K¯,∀i = 1, ..., N and
∑
k=1,...,K¯
α˜k+
∑
i=1,...,N
αi =
1. They are hidden to the agents and known only by the Principal who masters the
capacity market. 0 ≤ q¯∗k ≤ qˆk is the quantity of energy produced by generator Gk
and certified by the Principal. 0 ≤ q¯e∗i ≤ qˆei is the quantity of energy delivered by
microgrid Mi and certified by the Principal. For the mechanism m to check SWB, it is
necessary to have: (
q¯∗k
)
k
= arg max
(q¯k)k
∑
k=1,...,K¯
α˜kp˜ik (16)
s. t.
∑
k=1,...,K¯
q¯k ≤
∑
i=1,...,N
Di
0 ≤ q¯k ≤ qˆk,∀k = 1, ..., K¯
and
(q¯e∗i )i = arg max
(q¯ei )i
∑
i=1,...,N
αipii (17)
s. t.
∑
i=1,...,N
q¯i
e ≤
∑
i=1,...,N
Di −
∑
k=1,...,K¯
q¯∗k
0 ≤ q¯ei ≤ qˆei ,∀i = 1, ..., N
The optimization problem described by Equations (16) and (17) is a hierarchical
one. This means that it can be broken into K¯ + N sub-problems of optimization.
For the generator having the k-th highest priority level, the capacities and the reports
associated to the ordered sequence of generators are denoted q¯(k), qˆ(k) and the utility,
p˜i(k).
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The k-th optimization problem is:
q¯(k)∗ = arg max
q¯(k)
p˜i(k)|(
q¯(l)∗
)
l=1,...,k−1
s. t. 0 ≤ q¯(k) ≤
∑
i=1,...,N
Di −
∑
l=1,...,k−1
q¯(l)∗
0 ≤ q¯(k) ≤ qˆ(k)
and the (k + i)-th optimization problem is:
q¯e∗i = arg max
q¯ei
pii|(q¯∗l )l=1,...,K¯,(qe∗j )j=1,...,i−1
s. t. 0 ≤ q¯ei ≤
∑
i=1,...,N
Di −
∑
l=1,...,K¯
q¯∗l −
∑
j=1,...,i−1
q¯e∗i
0 ≤ q¯ei ≤ qˆei
We let uP ∈ RK¯+ be the vector of efforts made by the Principal. In particular,
uP (k) ≥ 0 is the effort made by the Principal toward generator Gk. This effort
characterizes the side-payment between the Principal and the generator. There is no
side-payment between the Principal and the microgrids because the microgrids are al-
ready paid by the suppliers for their demand response ; these payments are supposed
to compensate the effort made by the eco-neighborhood inhabitants in storage equip-
ment, in the monitoring of their online consumption through boxes, sensors and in
related energy management services. According to the constraints imposed in Equa-
tions (16) and (17) on the capacity to certify, the function φ is always negative or
null i.e., φ ≤ 0. We consider a mechanism m where the side-payments are defined
as follows: Tk = cP (k)φ tk where tk ≥ 0 is a function depending on the intensity
of the generator’s untruthfulness when reporting his production to the Principal and
cP (k) = c0 exp
(
− ρψ(uP (k))
)
is the cost invested by the Principal per unit of ca-
pacity of category k to construct in order to compensate for the missing capacity. It is
exponentially decreasing in the Principal’s effort.
Proposition 9. The mechanism m is IR if, and only if when capacity is missing i.e.,
φ < 0, the Principal’s effort toward generator Gk takes the form:
uP (k) = ψ
−1
(1
ρ
log{ c0φ tk
(p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk
}
)
Proof of Proposition 9. We determine the values of uP (k) for which the mechanism
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m is IR in the case of missing capacity i.e., φ < 0:
p˜ik ≥ 0 ⇔ (p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk ≥ cP (k)φ tk
⇔
(p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk
φ tk
≥ c0 exp
(
− ρψ(uP (k))
)
⇔ 1
ρ
log{ c0φ tk
(p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk
} ≤ ψ(uP (k))
According to the assumptions made on function ψ(.), it is strictly increasing and con-
cave. Therefore, it is bijective. This means that the equation:
1
ρ
log{ c0φ tk
(p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk
} = ψ(uP (k))
has a unique solution. This is the one that the Principal will choose since it will mini-
mize his effort while guaranteeing the market opening to new investors.
Proposition 10. If the side-payment imposed by the Principal to the generator Gk is
of the form:
Tk = −KM∗k (qˆk − q¯0k)2
then the mechanism m is IC. We set K > 1 to characterize the strength of the punish-
ment andM∗k = maxq¯k≥0
{[
(p˜k−ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik−uk
]
−
[
(p˜k|q¯0k−ck|q¯0k)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik|q¯0k−
uk|q¯0k
]}
; the other agents’ capacities being set to the values reported to the Principal.
Proof of Proposition 10. Generator Gk has no incentive to cheat on his capacity
production if, and only if:
p˜ik|q¯0k,(qˆl)l 6=k,(qˆei )i > p˜ik|qˆk,(qˆl)l 6=k,(qˆei )i , ∀(qˆl)l=1,...,K¯ (18)
If Tk|q¯0k,(qˆl)l 6=k > Tk|qˆk,(qˆl)l 6=k +M∗k then Equation (18) holds, where we set:
M∗k = maxq¯k≥0
{[
(p˜k − ck)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik − uk
]
−
[
(p˜k|q¯0k − ck|q¯0k)
∑
i=1,...,N
qik|q¯0k −
uk|q¯0k
]}
. Substituting the side-payment expression in the above inequality, we obtain:
tk|q¯0k,(qˆl)l 6=k < tk|qˆk,(qˆl)l 6=k +
M∗k
cP (k)φ
. Assuming that the side-payment imposed by the
Principal to the generator Gk is quadratic in qˆk − q¯0k i.e., tk = k¯(qˆk − q¯0k)2 with k¯ ≥ 0,
we obtain: − M∗kcP (k)φ 1(qˆk−q¯0k)2 < k¯. Energy quantities (produced or reported) are usually
large enough to be approximated by integers. Then in the worst case: − M∗kcP (k)φ < k¯.
Therefore it is sufficient to choose k¯ = K(− M∗kcP (k)φ ) with K > 1.
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According to Proposition 10, the side-payment imposed by the Principal to the
generator Gk does not depend on the investment performed by the Principal to re-
equilibrate the system. But, of course, the strength of punishment can be indexed on
this value.
Algorithm 2 Mechanism Design Implementation
1: The capacities (q¯0k)k and (q¯
e0
i )i are generated and monitored only by their
generator.
2: Generators (Gk)k and microgrids (Mi)i report publicly their estimated pro-
ductions to the Principal.
3: The Principal certifies the capacities using Equations (16) and (17).
4: Algorithm 1 is run delivering the Nash equilibrium
(
(σ∗i )i, (σ˜
∗
k)k
)
.
5 a: The true capacity values (q¯0k)k and (q¯
e0
i )i are inferred by the Principal from
the energy market performance.
5 b: The Principal computes the side-payments Tk for each generator Gk. If
the system lacks the capacity to meet the total demand, the Principal triggers the
feedback mechanism: he invests uP (k) additional units in each generator Gk’s
equipment and punishes him according to the side-payment Tk < 0.
To compute his optimal decision variables in the Nash equilibrium, each agent takes
as input the certified capacities for the other agents and his true hidden capacity value.
4 Numerical illustrations
Energy and capacity market operations are highly dependent on the calibration of the
parameters introduced throughout the article. In this section, we first represent numer-
ically the impact of the parameters on the game output, measured through the agents’
utilities and social welfare. The paramters should therefore be calibrated depending on
the expected output. Second, we study the rate of convergence of the stochastic opti-
mization algorithm used to certify the capacities. Finally, the ability of our mechanism
to force the agents to tell the truth is analysed under various punishment strengths.
We model the efficiency of the effort in reducing costs through an s-curve: ψ(u) =
1
1+exp(−ωu)− 12 where ω > 0 is a parameter characterizing the slope of the s-curve. In-
deed, innovation consists in a continual cost reduction resulting from recurring invest-
ment on technology upgrades as well as on research and development. Furthermore,
the technological progress paths observed in empirical studies identify the performance
of a technology with an s-curve [1], [30].
Regarding the parameters, we choose: ε = 10−5, N = 4,K = 3 (except for the
test of the market structure impact where N and K both span integers between 1 and
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20), e1 = 70.67, q¯01 = 2.2.10
3, q¯02 = 22.10
3, q¯03 = 30.10
3, Di ∈ [2.102; 3.103],∀i =
1, 2, 3, 4, p1 = 0.022, p2 = 0.022, p3 = 0.033, β(2) = 0.53, β(3) = 0.878, β(4) =
0.67, θ(2) = 2, θ(3) = 4.8, θ(4) = 2.7, ck0 ∈ [10; 100],∀k = 1, 2, 3.
4.1 Calibration of the energy market parameters
Impact of ρ and γ. We observe in Figure 2 (c) and (d) that the generator’s utility
is increasing in the technological opportunity and that it reaches its maximum for a
substitutability parameter around 8. The decrease of the generator’s utility as a function
of the increase substituability of the energy sources, as observed in Figure 2 (d), can be
explained by the fact that, in case of strong substitutability of the energy sources, the
suppliers will choose the cheapest. This price war encourages the generators to align
their prices on a common value (cf. Figure 3 (c)), which is smaller than their price
under full competition. This phenomenon spreads to the microgrids which are forced
to decrease and then to align their demand response prices (cf. Figure 3 (b)). For γ
large enough, the supplier will face with a unit price for the generators’ productions
and a unit price for the demand response ; both of them remaining large (around 0.1
for the generators and around 0.1 for the microgrids). As γ increases, the supplier
has less and less opportunity to price discriminate between his energy sources which
causes the decrease of his utility (cf. Figure 3 (a)).
Impact of the market structure. We observe, in Figure 4 (a) and (b), that the so-
cial welfare is increasing as a function of the competition pressure, both at the supplier
and at the generator level, for N and K larger than 8.
Impact of the disparity of the demand responses performed by the geograph-
ically distant microgrids. We evaluate the impact of the disparity of the microgrids’
productions on the other agents’ utilities. The Gini coefficient can be used to evaluate
the disparity of the demand responses. Its value belongs to the interval [0; 1]. A value
of 0 means perfect equality of the demand responses whereas a value of 1 means total
heterogeneity of the demand responses. According to Figure 5 (a), the suppliers have
larger utilities when the microgrids’ production is rather homogeneous i.e. Gini index
smaller than 0.35. Indeed: if all the microgrids produce a high rather homogeneous
level of demand response, the suppliers will prefer buying their energy to the micro-
grid than to the generators whose unit prices are far higher than the microgrids’ prices,
which remain constant pe1 = 2.47, p
e
2 = 2.8, p
e
3 = 4.7 (cf. Figure 5 (c)); if all the
microgrids produce few, the orders of the suppliers will be so large that the regulator
will be forced to intervene. The demand responses becoming more heterogenous (i.e.,
Gini index larger than 0.35), some suppliers will be forced to buy energy to the gen-
erators since, by assumption, there is no communication between the microgrids. To
capture more demand, these latter will decrease their price, falling below the demand
response prices. In turn, this will enable them to compensate their effort by increasing
their revenue (cf. Figures 5 (b) and (d)).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Evaluation of the impact of the technological opportunity (ρ) and of the substi-
tutability parameter (γ) on the generator’s utility while zooming on the parameters i.e., for
γ ∈ [1; 10], ρ ∈ [1; 10] (a), and while dezooming i.e., for γ ∈ [1; 50], ρ ∈ [1; 50] (b). Making
slices of the level sets, we plot the generator’s utility as a function of ρ (c) and as function of γ
(d).
4.2 Convergence of the certification algorithm
The K¯ + N nested optimization problems derived from Equations (16) and (17) are
solved using the cross-entropy method [28], adapted to optimization. More precisely,
we specify a random mechanism to generate feasible solutions (samples) controlled
by a set of parametrized probability distribution functions. Based on the performance
of the samples, the parameters are updated iteratively by minimizing Kullback-Leibler
cross-entropy in order to generate better solutions in next iterations and avoid being
trapped in local optima.
Due to the hierarchical structure of the problem, the trick is to assume that each
optimization problem search space is included in the search spaces of agents having
highest priority levels. As a consequence, to certify the generator capacity, we have to
use the previously certified capacity of the highest priority level generators and simi-
larly for the microgrids. Furthermore, as we saw in the equation (17), the certification
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3: Evaluation of the impact of the substitutability parameter (γ) on the suppliers’ utilities
(a). In (b) (resp. (c)), we plot the evolution of the microgrids’ prices per unit of demand response
(resp. the generators’s prices per unit of production) as functions of γ.
of the microgrids uses the previously calculated certification of the generators to de-
fine the associated optimization problem search spaces. From a computational point of
view, this means that we cannot isolate each certification to improve the time of calcu-
lation of the certification process but, at the same time, the search spaces being smaller
and smaller, this might reduce the rate of convergence. For any k = 1, ..., K¯, the com-
putation of the optima M∗k defined in Proposition 10 is based on the same principle ;
the constraints on the capacities being relaxed.
In Figures 6 (a) and (b) resp., the optimal quantities of capacity to certify, for the
microgrids and for the generators resp., are represented as functions of the number of
iterations required for the stochastic optimization algorithm to converge. We observe
that, in both cases, convergence is achieved for a number of iterations smaller than 600.
4.3 To cheat or not to cheat?
We test the effect of bias introduction in the generators’ capacity reports, on one of the
generators utility, at equilibrium, obtained as output of Algorithm 2, for four values
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Social welfare represented as a function of the competion pressure at the supplier level
(a) and of the competition pressure at the generator level (b) for three values of the substitutability
parameter i.e., γ = 0.1, 2, 6.
of the punishment strength: K = 1.2, 3, 6, 10. We observe in Figure 7 (a) that, for
any value of the punishment strength, the more the generator cheats (by increasing the
bias in his capacity report), the stronger is the punishment imposed by the Principal.
Furthermore, for the considered generator, a threshold effect appears for bias values
comprised between 3.5 and 4.5:
• If the bias is smaller or equal to the threshold, the punishment makes the genera-
tor’s utility decrease but their resulting utility decreasing is inversely proportional
to the strength of the punishment. This is due to the heterogenity of the strength
of the punishments imposed to the set of generators involved in the game. More
precisely, generators having a large strength of punishment K are nearly sure to
be strongly punished if they cheat. They will therefore prefer small biases which
might enable them to increase their revenue while compensating the imposed
punishment.
• If the bias is larger than the treshold, the fear of punishment should remove any
incentive to cheat.
The suppliers’ utilities decrease as the bias in the generators’ capacity reports increases
(cf. Figure 7 (b)). Indeed, the generators are forced to raise their production prices to
compensate the regulator’s punishments.
On the overall, the mechanism designed in Section 3 is efficient because it makes
the generators’ utilities decrease as functions of the bias in their capacity report. But
the output result depends on the heterogenity of the strength of the punishments.
5 Conclusion
The originality of this article lies, first, in the coupling of energy and capacity market
and, second, in the characterization of their economic behavior through game theory.
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(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 5: Evaluation of the impact of the disparity of the demand responses on supplier 3’s
utility (a), on the generators’ utilities (b), on the generators’ prices (c) and efforts (d).
The energy market was represented as a three level decentralized system involving gen-
erators, suppliers and microgrids. Our main results can be summarized as follows: we
computed analytically the energy market equilibrium in the generators’ prices, efforts
and in the suppliers’ energy orders toward generators and microgrids, which can per-
form demand response ; we determine analytically the expressions of the price per unit
of production for the generators and per unit of demand response, as functions of the
price per unit of demand at the consumer level ; finally, we design rules for the capac-
ity market guaranteeing the system wide balance, the market opening to new investors,
avoiding moral hazard and abuse of dominant positions. These rules are imposed by
the Principal to the generators through punishments in case of system wide imbalance
and through the delivery of capacity certificates.
Other economic interpretations can be gained from the analysis of the game out-
put. Tthe normalized coefficients characterizing the energy sources priority might be
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Optimal quantities of capacity to certify for the microgrids (a) and for the generators
(b) as functions of the number of iterations in the cross-entropy algorithm.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Utilities of one generator (a) and of one supplier (b), obtained as output of Algo-
rithm 2. They are functions of the biases introduced by the generators in their capacity reports.
optimized so as to guarantee a minimum level of carbon emissions. Furthermore, it
might be used to characterize more finely the economic impact resulting from the in-
troduction of renewable energies and demand response, on the final users’ price paid
per demand unit and individual welfare.
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